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IN THE SU-PREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FTAH STATE BUILDING 
BOARD, et al, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
GEORGE R. ROMNEY and M. 
\VALLIS ROMNEY, d/b/a G. 
l\L\ lTRlCE R 0 M N E Y COM-
PANY, a Partnership, et al, Case No. 
Defendants, Third-Party 10143 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL I N DE M N I T Y 
C 0 J.VIP ANY, a corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELL~TS 
ST.A_TE::\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought against the General Con-
tractor, Romney Company, and its bonding company by 
creditors of a subcontractor, with a Third-Party Com-
3 
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plaint by the General Contractor over against said sub-
contractor's bonding company. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the Pre-Trial,the General Contractor's (Appel-
lant) Third-Party Complaint over against the sub-
contractor's bonding company, Industrial Indemnity 
Company (Respondent) , was ordered dismissed and a 
subsequent Judgment of Dismissal was filed. The bal-
ance of the case involving the creditors' claims against 
the General Contractor was tried and a judgment taken 
against the General Contractor. Most of the creditors' 
claims were compromised and paid by theGeneral Con-
tractor, Romney, just prior to trial. However, Rocky 
Mountain Refrigeration Company, the original plain-
tiff, obtained said judgment, its claim not being settled. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The General Contractor, Romney, appellant herein, 
seeks reversal of the Judgment dismissing its Third-
Party Complaint against the subcontractor's bonding 
company, Industrial Indemnity Company, respondent 
herein, and seeks to remand the case to the trial court 
for trial of the Third-Party complaint legal and factual 
issues. 
4 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rmnney Company, General Contractor and appel-
lunt herein, entered into a contract with the Utah State 
Building Board to construct the Rehabilitation Center 
nt the University of Utah (Exhibits D-17, (P-3) (R. 
-t:J) • Romney furnished the bond required under Title 
14 .. 1·1. Utah Code Annotated (R. 170, 225), wherein 
the State of Utah was named as obligee, Romney was 
named as principal, and American Surety Company 
was named surety and obligor. 
Subcontractor, Walsh Plumbing Company, had a 
subcontract with Romney to do the plumbing portion 
of the general contract work (Ex. D-16) (R. 43). 
'Valsh furnished in connection with said subcontract a 
bond, wherein appellant was named as obligee and 
owner, 'Valsh was named as principal, and Industrial 
Indemnity Company, respondent herein, was named as 
surety and obligor (Pre-Trial Ex. 1). 
During and after construction, Romney paid Walsh 
for the subcontract work in reliance upon Lien Waivers 
furnished by the Walsh creditors (R. 49, 50, 51 (Ex. 
P. 10). 'Valsh, however, either did not pay these credi-
tors, or paid them by check, which checks were returned 
because of insufficient funds ( R. 23, 26, 36, 44, 259) 
(Ex. P-9). 
These individual creditors did not give the written 
notice as is specified in respondent's bond (R. 226) . 
Said notice requirement of the bond in effect states 
5 
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that the creditor or claimant must notify in writing 
within 90 days of completion of the creditor's work any 
two of the three parties to the bond, i.e., the obligee, 
Romney, the principal, Walsh, and the obligor, re~ 
spondent . 
. The bond further defines a claimant under the bond 
as one furnishing labor and materials on the project 
(Pre-Trial Ex. 1) . 
The Walsh creditors thereafter brought this action 
against appellant and its bonding company, American 
Surety Company, under Section 14-1-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, but did not sue respondent, Walsh's 
bonding company. Romney answered the Complaints 
of the original plaintiff and intervening plaintiffs, deny~ 
ing liability upon various grounds (Pleadings, R. 6, 34, 
46, 53, 63). Romney also by its Third-PartyComplaint, 
complained over against respondent, third-pai.-ty de-
fendant Walsh's bonding company, upon said. bond, 
(Pre-Trial Ex. 1) for any judgment obtained against 
Romney by the Walsh creditors (R. 8-10, 28-30). 
The case came on for Pre-Trial before Judge A. H. 
Ellett on February 24, 1964 (R. 225-228). At the Pre-
Trial, respondent claimed, "that the bond was not made 
for the benefit of the Romney Company, but was made 
for the benefit of materialmen, and since no material-
men had given notice as prescribed by. Paragraph 3 (a) 
of the Industrial Indemnity bond," Romney could not 
recover. The Court, in Paragraph 9 of the Pre-Trial 
Order, stated: 
6 
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"The Court will hold as a matter of law that 
Homney cannot recover under Pre-Trial Ex-
hibit I." ( R. 226) . 
• \ t the Pre-Trial, issues between the plaintiffs and 
Homney involving various defenses were set forth and 
set down for subsequent trial (R. 225-228). The primary 
issue remaining for trial insofar as each of the plaintiffs 
were concerned involved the reasonableness of some of 
the plaintiffs' claims and the question as to whether or 
not the work was actually performed on the project 
(R. 226). 
At the trial, appellant defended against the claim 
of Rocky ~fountain Refrigeration Company, but was 
unsuccessful and a judgment was obtained against 
appellant. Rocky Mountain was one of the unpaid credi-
tors of 'V alsh Plumbing Company which appellant 
contends gives it the right to recover over against re-
spondent. Just prior to trial, appellant was able to 
compromise and settle all other creditors' claims (R. 
262-264) (R. 241-249). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE C 0 U R T ERRED IN DISMISSING 
THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST 
THE RESPONDENT. 
7 
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A. THE FAILURE OF CLAIMANTS TO 
GIVE PROPER NOTICE DOES NOT BAR AN 
ACTION ON THE BOND BY THE APPEL-
LANT OBLIGEE. 
(I) THE BOND PROVISIONS DO NOT 
PRECLUDE RECOVERY BY THE OBLI-
GEE. 
Appellant, Romney, is the Owner-Obligee under 
the bond. Romney required Walsh, the Subcontractor, 
to furnish a bond "for the satisfactory performance of 
this agreement" (the Subcontract). (Ex. D-16 and 2nd 
page of Pre-Trial Ex. 1) . The bond itself provides in 
part, as follows: 
"Principal ... and Surety are held and firmly 
bound unto ... Romney-· .. as Obligee, herein-
after called Owner, for the use and benefit of 
claimants as hereinbelow defined ... " 
Paragraph 1, page 2, of the bond defines a claimant 
as one furnishing labor and materials to the Principal. 
Paragraph 3, in requiring written notice be given to 
any two of the following: The Principal, the Owner 
(Romney), or the Surety (Respondent), only makes 
this requirement of a claimant. There is nothing in any 
of the conditions precedent set forth in the bond requir-
ing the 0 bligee on the bond to give notice as a prerequi-
site to filing suit. 
The Court, in its Pre-Trial Order, stated: 
"8. The parties agree that no one gave any 
notice to the Industrial Indemnity Company or 
8 
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to \ V alsh Plumbing Company or to Romney 
Con1pany as required in Paragraph 3 (a) on Page 
2 of the Industrial Indemnity Company bond. 
"9. The Industrial Indemnity Company claims 
that the bond was not made for the benefit of the 
Romney Company, but was made for the benefit 
of materialmen, and since no materialmen have 
given notice as prescribed by paragraph 3 (a) of 
the Industrial Indemnity bond, the Court will 
hold as a matter of law that Romney Company 
cannot recover under pre-trial Exhibit 1." 
The court thus in effect held that the Obligee was 
barred from suing on the bond because the claimants 
had not given written notice. Obviously, the failure to 
give such a notice cannot affect the rights of the Obligee. 
Had the bonding company intended that the Obligee 
give notice, or be barred from any action because of a 
failure to give notice, then it could and should have so 
provided in the bond. In Hartford Accident & Indem-
nity Company v. Orr, 321 P. 2d 373 (Okla.) (1958), 
the bond requires the Obligee, as a condition precedent 
to any right of recovery, to furnish a written notice of 
default to the Surety. Bonds are construed against the 
Surety which draws them and it must be assumed that 
if such a notice was to be applied against an Obligee, 
the bond would so indicate. See Chapman v. HoageJ 
296 U.S. 526; Stearns Law of Suretyship, 5th Edition, 
page 12; and Corp. of Pres. of L.D.S. v. H artfordJ 98 
t'lah 297, 95 P.2d 736, wherein this Court said: "But 
sureties in building contracts are not entitled to any 
notice of default unless the agreement specifically pro-
vides therefor." 
9 
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Furthermore ,the notice required in this bond leaves 
the Obligee completely uninformed and at the mercy 
of the claimant and Surety. For example, the provisions 
require the claimant to notify any two of the three par-
ties to the bond, and thus a notice can be given to the 
Principal and Surety without being given to the Obligee. 
And as a converse to this, the Obligee would not know 
(and did not) whether or not notice had been given 
and would thus not be able to protect itself in order 
to preserve its right under the bond. Thus it is apparent 
that the notice required was not intended to relate in 
:;~.ny way to the 0 bligee. In our case, it is evident that 
the failure of the claimant to give such a notice was 
not a failure of the Obligee. However, under the Court's 
interpretation of this provision, the Obligee is deprived 
of its right on the bond through a failure over which it 
had no control, or knowledge thereof. 
Thus, it is manifestly inequitable, impractical and 
contrary to the provisions and intent of the bond to 
deprive the Obligee of its right on the bond because of 
the failure of a claimant to give written notice of its 
claim. Such a provision could bar the claimant, but 
certainly not the Obligee. 
(2) APPELLANT ROMNEY'S RIGHTS 
AS OBLIGEE ARE SEPARATE FROM THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CLAIMANTS. 
It is fundamental in these construction bonds that 
the Obligee's rights are separate and independent from 
the rights of the claimants. As stated in Stearns Law 
10 
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of Su,rdyahip. 5th Ed., Par. 8:18, p. 266, entitled, 
~~Bonds to Secure Building Contracts": 
"The Surety's bond is of a dual nature and 
contains several undertakings running to the 
Owner, the Obligee on the bond: One for his own 
protection, and the other for the ben.efit of third 
persons who furnish labor or materials." 
Traditionally, the Obligee has the right of action 
on the bond. This right has been extended by ·statute 
and by various provisions of ~onstructoin bonds to also 
give a right of action o~ the ·bond to those £lirnis~ing 
labor and materials to 'the Principal. I'n H ochimar 'v~ 
MarlJland Casualty Company~ 114 F.2d 948 (Mary-
land) (1940), the Court separated the Obligee's rights 
from those of the beneficiary's under the bond, stating: 
I 
"However, the Obligee's premature. payment 
of retained percentages cannot affect the rights 
of third-party beneficiaries against the Surety." 
In other words, th~ failure of t:Qe Obligee to pr9tect 
its right under the . bond cannot affect the right of :;t 
third-party beneficiary under the bond. J u~t as surely, 
we must assume that the failure of a third~party b~:p.e­
ficiary to protect its rights cannot affect the right of ~he 
Obligee. 
In Equitable S'l~;rety Company v. U.S.~ ex rel Me~ 
Millan, 234 U.S. 448, 454, the Surety claimed as a 
defense against the materialmen that the Principal and 
Obligee had changed the contract which the· bond was 
intended to cover. The Court held that such a. defense 
11 
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could not be maintained against the materialmen, stat-
Ing: 
" ... The obligation (the bond) has a dual 
aspect, it being given in the first place to secure 
to the government the faithful performance of 
all obligations which a contractor may assume 
toward it; and, in the second place, to protect 
third persons from whom the contractor may ob-
tain materials or labor; and, that these two agree-
ments are as distinct as if contained in separate 
instruments." 
See also Griffith, et al v. Rundle, et al., 63 P. 199 
(Wash.) (1900). In 50 .A.m. Jur., p. 1025, it is stated: 
"The natural person to bring suit on the bond 
or other obligation of a surety is, of course, the 
obligee." 
The principle that the Obligee and the creditors or 
beneficiaries have independent and separate causes of 
action or rights under the bond is set forth in the Utah 
cases and in the Contractor's Bonding Statutes, par-
ticularly Section 14-1-2, f7tah Code Annotated. In 
State, et al v. Campbell Building Company ,et al, 94 
Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341, the Court discusses this statute, 
indicating that the Obligee does have a right under the 
bond separate from that of the creditors. The Court 
says with reference to this statute and the rights of the 
parties: 
"The restrictions are twofold: to give the Obli-
gee a priority to determine and protect any 
claim it may have, and to fix a one-year limitation 
on the Surety's liability to other creditors. When, 
therefore, the Obligee has had an opportunity to 
12 
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determine if it has any claims against the Surety, 
and assert the same, there are no good reasons 
why other creditors of the contractor should not 
be permitted to enforce their claims ... The 
Statute is not for the benefit of the contractor, 
but for the benefit of the Obligee, creditors, and 
Surety." 
The wording of the statute itself provides for two 
separate actions: One by the Obligee, and one by the 
creditors or beneficiaries under the bond. The Obligee 
is given the first right of action under the bond, and 
only after a period of six months within which the Obli-
gee has the right to ·bring its action, can the creditors 
thereupon intervene or bring their own action on the 
bond. 
Admittedly, the bond in question here is not a statu-
tory contractor's bond, such as is required under Title 
14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, and such as is discussed 
in the Campbell case, supra. However, the wording of 
the subject bond, wherein it provides that the bond is for 
the use and benefit of claimants, to-wit, those furnishing 
labor and materials to the Principal, is the s:;tme wording 
as is requried under said statute and in the bonds dis~ 
cussed in the Campbell case and other Utah cases cited 
below. There is no doubt but that the Obligee has a right 
of action on the bond, which is made for the benefit ·of 
those furnishing labor and materials. In Uiah State 
Building Commission v. Great American Indemnity 
Company, 105 Utah 11, 140 P. 2d 763, the Court dis-
cussed the statutory bond and whether or not the Obligee 
had a right thereon even though it was defective in its 
13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
corporate status. The Court said, in giving the Obligee 
a right under such a bond: 
''The Utah State Building Commission was the 
only proper Obligee on the bond, and the only 
entity that could have properly brought this ac-
tion." 
Also, in Johnson Service Company v. E. H. MomnJ 
171 N.E. 692 (N.Y.) (1930), the court held that the 
Obligee under the bond had a cause of action thereon 
even though the bond was conditioned upon the payment 
by the contractor of laborers and materialmen. The court 
said: 
"For a valuable consideration, the Contractor 
and the Surety have covenanted with the munici-
pality that payment shall be made to material-
men and laborers whether protected by a lien or 
not. If they are not paid, the promisee intervenes 
and collects for their use the payment that is 
due." 
See also Colorado Fuel & Iron Company v. Dodge} 52 
P. 637 (Colo.) (1898), and Bristol v. Bostwick} 240 
S.W. 774 (Tenn.) (1917), wherein the Obligee is given 
a right to bring an action in its own right, as well as for 
the use and benefit of the Principal's creditors. In 
Deluxe Glass Company v. Martin} 116 Utah 144, 208 
P. 2d 1127, the court holds that the Owner is entitled to 
sue on the bond, given to protect the Owner from failure 
of the Principal to pay for all labor and materials on 
the project. 
14 
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B. ACTU~\L NOTICE IN LIEU OF WRIT-
TEN NOTICE IS SUFFICIENT. 
The Court ruled in its Pre-Trial Order and J udg-
ment, to the effect that written notice was not given 
and thus the Obligee's right was lost. It is well accepted 
that the notice provisions in a bond must be reasonable. 
Reasonable notice also consists of actual notice. The 
Court, however, ruled without permitting the case to 
go to trial to determine whether or not there was actual 
notice or waiver of notice. (R. 139, 229). See Corp. 
of Pres. of L.D.S. v. Hartford~ supra; 50 Am. Jur. 
p. 984, 1115. 
Furthermore, there was no showing, in determining 
whether or not the notice was reasonable, that the Surety 
Company was in any way prejudiced by the failure to 
give said notice. Again, this is a factual matter which 
should have been developed at the trial, but which was 
elin1inated as a matter of law by the Court's ruling and 
Judgment. 
The notice required by the bond, even assuming it 
has application to the Obligee, is not reasonable and is 
arbitrary in its ultimate result. The Obligee for whose 
benefit the bond is given, has no opporunity of knowing 
whether or not the condition precedent of written notice 
is being complied with. The notice requirements give 
the claimant an election to ignore the Obligee . Thus, 
if the Obligee is bound by this notice requirement, it 
can be and was arbitrarily cut off from its rights under 
the bond. Such a notice, if ,applied to the Obligee, i~ 
15 
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arbitrary and capricious in its result, and is, therefore, 
an unreasonable, unconscionable and unenforceable 
provision of the bond. Courts will not uphold an arbi-
trary notice requirement. The Obligee should, therefore, 
not be bound by such an unreasonable contractual re-
quirement. Courts interpret contracts, where possible, 
to give validity to individual contractual provisions. 
To give validity to this provision, the court cannot and 
should not apply it to the Obligee. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL ON APRIL 2, 
1964 AS A NUNC PRO TUNC JUDGMENT TO 
BE EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 21, 1964. 
The Pre-Trial Order entered February 21, 1964, 
was not a final judgment from which an appeal could 
be taken. The judgment entered April 2, 1964, was a 
final judgment from which an appeal could be taken. 
The April 2, 1964, judgment cannot be made nunc pro 
tunc to take away rights of appeal which otherwise 
would still be valid and effective. The filing of the judg-
ment April 2, 1964, initiates the running of the time for 
appeal. United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 
356 u.s. 227. 
SUMMARY 
It is clear that the court has failed to distinguish 
between the rights of an Obligee and the rights of claim-
16 
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au ts under the bond. This bond was required by the 
Obligee as Owner to assure that the Principal (Sub-
contractor) would pay for its labor and material fur-
nished under the Subcontract. The Subcontractor did 
not pay for said labor and materials, and as a result, 
the Obligee was sued not under the Subcontractor's 
bond, but under its own public contract bond. Obligee 
is thus without a remedy because of the court's ruling. 
The court has now denied the 0 bligee its rights 
under the bond upon the theory that the claimants' 
failure to file the necessary written notice eliminates all 
causes of action on the bond. The default of the claim-
ants, beyond the Obligee's control, cannot and should 
not prejudice the rights of the Obligee. This notice re-
quirement is unreasonable and in no way applicable to 
Obligee. The case should be remanded for trial so that 
the rights of the Obligee-appellant against respondent 
under its bond may be determined. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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